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IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW WILL THE MEMORY EVER FADE?:
PEOPLEv. MARRERO
The maxims error juris' or ignorantia legis,2 which provided

that mistake or ignorance of law was no defense to criminal prosecution, were enshrined under the common law to promote legal order and secure prompt and practical enforcement of the law.3 In an
effort to alleviate the unjust results which had ensued from the
unyielding application of such maxims, courts and legislatures
have accepted that one's ignorance or mistake of law is a defense if
it negates a mental state required to establish a material element
of the crime.4 As our society has become increasingly complex and
I The maxim errorjuris non excusat declares that mistake of law does not excuse. See
Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 421, 430-31 (1957).
2 Ignorantia legis non excusat, sometimes expressed as ignorantiajuris neminem excusat, declares that ignorance of the law excuses no one (neminem excusat) or simply does
not excuse (non excusat). See Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM.&
MARY L. REV. 671, 671 n.4 (1976).
1 See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 360 (2d ed. 1960). Legal scholars
have provided various arguments defending the punishment of individuals who are ignorant
or mistaken as to the law. See Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L.
REv. 641, 646-51 (1941). Professor Hall argues that if society were to allow a defendant to
successfully assert a mistake of law defense the premise of legal order itself would be contradicted. J. HALL, supra, at 361-68.
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that even though the maxim of errorjuris would operate
to convict a defendant who really did not know that he was breaking the law, the maxim
should so operate because allowing such an excuse would encourage ignorance of the law.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881). Holmes argued, "men [must] know and obey,
and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of
the scales." Id.
Professor Austin has asserted that "to investigate a man's knowledge or ignorance of
the law in each case would hopelessly enmesh the courts in assessing virtually insoluble
problems." J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 498-500 (1869). See also Hall & Seligman, supra, at 647 (questions raised by mistake of law defense even more complex than
insanity defense).
Blackstone's Commentaries justified ignorantialegis as an effective deterrent to crime.
I

W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*45-46.

Professor Perkins has suggested that various arguments advanced in support of the
maxim are dependent upon "matters of 'public policy' or 'public necessity.'" Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1939). Moreover, "[t]he
welfare of society and the safety of the state have been felt to require this maxim 'in order
practically to administer justice among men.'" Id.
See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at 405 (2d ed. 1986). In crimes which
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a growing number of strict liability and regulatory offenses have
been created by legislation, the application of these maxims to
such new offenses may lead to even more unjust results.5 In response to this trend, legislatures have created a limited exception
to the mistake of law doctrine when an individual relies on an official statement of the law.' New York's Penal Law, for example, has
require specific criminal intent, courts or legislatures have provided that "any condition
negativing the existence of the required state of mind should result in an acquittal. Thus a
mistake of law which has this effect may give [rise to] a defense." Hall & Seligman, supra
note 3, at 641. Similarly, a special mental element required for some particular offenses may
be other than intent, and mistake or ignorance of law may negate the existence of such an
element. Perkins, supra note 3, at 47. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933) (defendant who honestly believed he was not obligated to provide information could
not be punished for "willfully" failing to provide information); United States v. Squires, 440
F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1971) (defendant not guilty of making material false statement when ignorance negatived "knowledge" necessary to establish material element); State v. Lazarus, 181
Iowa 625, 164 N.W. 1037 (1917) (defendant honestly mistaken as to existence of a fact who
swore thereto was not guilty of "willfully and corruptly" swearing falsely); People v. Weiss,
276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938) (defendants had valid defense in good faith belief that
they were acting within the law). However, in each case where a mistake or ignorance of law
is a defense, the defendant "is saved from conviction [because] . . . one of the elements
required for guilt has been disproved." Perkins, supra note 3, at 46. "Needless to say guilt
would be established even in such a case if defendant's knowledge of law was conclusively
presumed, but this is one of the recognized exceptions and the presumption is not conclusive at this point." Id.
6 See Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392 (1986);
Note, Reliance on Apparent Authority as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution,77 COLUM. L.
REv. 775, 784 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Apparent Authority]. There is a tension between
the rule that ignorance or mistake of law does not excuse, and the idea that moral blameworthiness should precede punishment. Note, Apparent Authority, supra, at 784. At common law, these concepts were more congruent because criminal acts were recognized by the
whole community as morally wrong (malum in se). Id. "Awareness of wrongdoing was inferred from the commission of the criminal act that also constituted a moral wrong ....
In
modern times, the criminal law has been vastly extended to include conduct not previously
deemed criminal (malum prohibitum)." Id. The classification of criminal acts based solely
on moral standards has become increasingly difficult because of the growing number of mala
prohibita offenses and "[tihe common law fiction that every man is presumed to know the
law has become indefensible in fact or logic." Id. Thus, "where it is '[u]ndesirable to characterize as criminal an individual who has not demonstrated any degree of social dangerousness,' the modern trend has been to recognize mistake of law as a defense in limited instances." People v. Studifin, 132 Misc. 2d 326, 327-28, 504 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609-10 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1986) (citation omitted). The court found the defendant not guilty of criminal
possession of a handgun and possession of weapons with intent to sell because he believed,
based on misleading official advice, he had complied with all applicable laws. See id.
" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Section 2.04 provides
in pertinent part that:
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a
prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward
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incorporated the aforementioned exception to the general rule of
error juris.7 In furtherance of this statutory reform, several jurisdictions have allowed a mistake of law defense based on a reasonable misinterpretation of a statute.' Recently, however, in People v.
Marrero,9 the New York Court of Appeals held that a mistake of
determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative order or
grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body
charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense.
Id.
A majority of jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code's example, have codified a
mistake of law defense when premised upon reliance on official statements of law. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment 3, at 274-80 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20 (McKinney 1987). Section 15.20 provides in pertinent
part:
1. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages
in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless:
(a) Such factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for the
commission of an offense;...
2. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages
in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a statute or other enactment, or (b) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (c) a judicial decision of a state or federal
court, or (d) an interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.
Id.
The above exceptions "illustrate the principle that ordinarily, citizens may not be punished for actions undertaken in good-faith reliance on authoritative assurance that punishment will not attach; a citizen cannot be convicted for exercising a privilege the state had
clearly told him was available." 31 N.Y. Jun. 2D Criminal Law § 168, at 308 (1983); see also
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (no conviction under vague law);
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964) ("criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime"); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (no
conviction where notice that the conduct was illegal was highly unlikely).
8 See Perkins, supra note 3, at 45. An exception to the maxim error juris has been
recognized in the case of a bona fide reliance on or misinterpretation of an obscure or ambiguous statute not clarified by judicial decision. Id. at 51.
Another exception exists when the applicable law is vague or unclear so as to cause the
defendant to make a good faith mistake, because in those cases "a person's conduct can only
be based on guesswork or uncertainty." United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp. 585, 622
(E.D. Pa. 1979). If a defendant believes his act to be lawful and has a reasonable ground for
his belief because the law is obscure and unascertainable, "the rule that no mistake of law
excuses one from committing an offense cannot be applied." Burns v. State, 123 Tex. Crim.
611, 611-12, 61 S.W.2d 512, 512-13 (1933).
69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987).
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law defense would be recognized only if it is determined that there
was a mistake in the law itself or where specific intent is an element of the offense. 10
In Marrero,a federal corrections officer in Danbury, Connecticut,11 was arrested in a Manhattan social club for possession of a
loaded .38 caliber automatic pistol, 2 and charged with criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree."3 At the time of his
arrest, the defendant claimed he mistakenly believed that he was
entitled to such possession by virtue of his status as a federal corrections officer.' 4 Given the interplay of New York Criminal Procedure Law sections 2.1015 and 1.20,16 and New York Penal Law section 265.20,'1 Marrero believed that, as a "peace officer," he had

the right to carry a handgun without a permit. 18
The Supreme Court, New York County, held that the defendant, given his status as a federal corrections officer, was a "peace
officer" within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Law sections
1.20 and 2.10, and as such, was exempt from prosecution for possession of a weapon in the third degree under section 265.02 of the
10Id. at 391, 507 N.E.2d at 1072, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
11 Id. at 385, 507 N.E.2d at 1069, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
.2 Id.
at 384, 507 N.E.2d at 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
11 See id. at 396, 507 N.E.2d at 1076, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 220; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02
(McKinney 1980). Section 265.02 of the Penal Law provides in pertinent part that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when: ... (4) He possesses any loaded firearm." Id.
However, criminal possession has been construed to require possession which is both
knowing and voluntary. See People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402, 97 N.E. 877, 878 (1912);
People v. Cohen, 57 App. Div. 2d 790, 791, 394 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (1st Dep't 1977).
14 Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d at 384, 507 N.E.2d at 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
15N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10 (McKinney 1980). Section 2.10 provides in pertinent
part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law or charter to
the contrary, only the following persons shall have the powers of, and shall be
peace officers:...
25. Officials, as designated by the commissioner of the department of correctional services pursuant to rules of the department, and correctional officers of
any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution.
Id.
16 Id. § 1.20. Section 1.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides in pertinent part
that "peace officer means a person listed in section 2.10 of this chapter." Id.
17 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20 (McKinney Supp. 1988). Section 265.20 of the Penal Law
provides in pertinent part that "[section] ... 265.02 shall not apply to: (1) Possession of any
of the weapons, instruments, appliances or substances specified in [section] ... 265.02 ...
by the following: ... (c) Peace officers as defined by Section 2.10 of the criminal procedure
law. . . ." Id.
11 Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d at 384, 507 N.E.2d at 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
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Penal Law.19 A divided appellate division reversed the trial court's
decision and reinstated the indictment, holding that the defendant
was not exempt from prosecution because the legislative intent of
the exemption in Penal Law section 265.20 was to limit its application to New York officers and federal officers only when possession
of a weapon was duty-related or authorized by federal law, regulation or order.20
The trial court rejected the defendant's assertion that personal
misunderstanding of the statutory definition of a "peace officer"
was sufficient to exempt him from criminal liability under New
York's mistake of law statute. 2 The court's refusal to instruct the
jury on a mistake of law defense resulted in the defendant's conviction.22 The appellate division upheld the conviction.23 The court
of appeals affirmed and held that the defense of mistake of law was
not available to the defendant based on his personal misunderstanding of the statutory definition of "peace officer. "24
Writing for the court, Judge Bellacosa stated that the New
19See People v. Marrero, 94 Misc. 2d 367, 368, 404 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978), rev'd, 71 App. Div. 2d 346, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 69
N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987). The trial court determined that the
language of the Criminal Procedure Law which provided that, "[a]n attendant, or an official,
or guard of any state prison or of any penal correctional institution ... [was] ... ambiguously drawn" and it was "not inclined to choose an interpretation that will operate to the
detriment of the defendant." Id. Thus, the court hermeneutically determined the statute to
include persons who work for any penal correctional facility, not merely one under state
jurisdiction. Id.
20 See Marrero, 71 App. Div. 2d at 346-50, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 384-87. To interpret "peace
officer" the appellate division relied on principles of statutory construction and interpretation which require that "all parts of a statute must be harmonized with each other as well as
the general intent of the whole statute." Id. at 348, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 386 (quoting N.Y. STATuTEs 98(a) (McKinney 1980)). The court determined that the first two exemption clauses
under Penal Law section 265.20 dealt with two different categories of employees: clause (a)
dealt only with those of New York State, and clause (b) dealt only with those in federal
service. See Marrero, 71 App. Div. 2d at 347, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 386. Since the defendant was
in the latter category, he would have the legal right to carry a weapon in New York State
only if it was duty related or duly authorized by federal law, regulation or order. Id. at 350,
422 N.Y.S.2d at 387. The court reasoned that the defendant could not be deemed a "peace
officer" under clause (a) because the legislature had enacted a specific subsection which was
applicable to the defendant. Id.
The defendant allowed an appeal from the Appellate Division to lapse and be dismissed, and thus review of that aspect of the case was precluded. See Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d at
384, 507 N.E.2d at 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
21 See id. at 384-85, 507 N.E.2d at 1068, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
22 See id. at 385, 507 N.E.2d at 1069, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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York mistake statute was an outgrowth of the dogmatic commonlaw maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.2 5 In interpreting
the New York mistake statute, the court reasoned that the influence of the Model Penal Code2" and the policies underlying the
common-law doctrine were determinative. The court concluded
that the mistake of law defense was intended as a very narrow exception to the general rule that mistake of law is no defense.2"
Consequently, its application is restricted to situations where either the mistaken belief negates a specific intent required by a particular crime,29 or where there is a mistake in the law upon which a
25 Id. When the provision was first proposed, one commentator viewed the new language as "codify[ing] the established common-law maxim on mistake of law, while at the
same time recognizing a defense when the erroneous belief is founded upon an 'official statement of the law."' Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1469,
1486 (1964).
$$Cl Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d at 388, 507 N.E.2d at 1070-71, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 214-15. The
court of appeals adopted the prosecution's argument that the New York statute on mistake
or ignorance of the law is analogous to the approach taken by the Model Penal Code, even
though New York did not adopt the precise language of the Model Penal Code. See id. at
389, 507 N.E.2d at 1071, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 215. The defense, under the Model Penal Code,
would be available when reliance was based upon "an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous." Id. at 388, 507 N.E.2d at 1070, 515 N.Y.S.2d at
214 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)) (emphasis omitted).
However, the court found that the legislature intended the New York statute to be similarly
construed, as the legislative history of Penal Law section 15.20 was "replete with references
to the influence of the Model Penal Code provision." Id. (citation omitted).
Furthermore, the court found it significant that "no one for over 20 years of this statute's existence has made a point of arguing or noting or holding that the difference in wording has the broad and dramatically sweeping interpretation which is now proposed[]" by the
defendant: that a mistaken belief founded upon an official statement of law is a defense
under Penal Law section 15.20. Id. at 388, 507 N.E.2d at 1070-71, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 214-15.
2 Id. at 386, 507 N.E.2d at 1069, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 213. The policy reasons which the
court cited in support of the maxim were: (1) that law makers want to "encourage the societal benefit of individuals' knowledge of and respect for the law"; (2) to encourage the public
to read and rely on official statements of the law; and (3) not to have individuals conveniently question the validity and interpretation of the law and act on that basis. Id. at 386,
391-92, 507 N.E.2d at 1069, 1073, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 213, 217.
28 See id. at 387, 507 N.E.2d at 1070, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 214. The court stated that the
application of the mistake of law defense to the facts in Marrero would make the defense
generally available-such a result was not intended by the legislature. See id.
29 See id. at 391, 507 N.E.2d at 1072, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 216. The court cited Gardner v.
People, 62 N.Y. 299 (1875), and People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938), to
illustrate the resricted application of the doctrine at common law. See Marrero,69 N.Y.2d
at 385-86, 507 N.E.2d at 1069, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
In Gardner,the court held that the defendant's misinterpretation of a mala prohibita
law, which related to the removal of election officers, did not constitute a defense. Gardner,
62 N.Y. at 305. The court added that "[t]he defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. 'The rule on the subject appears to
be, that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in those mala prohibita,the only inquiry
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defendant relies and the law is later determined to be invalid."
The court stated that this decision would advance the strong public policy reasons at the foundation of the legislature's intentions
as to the mistake of law defense.3 1
Writing for the dissent, Judge Hancock argued that the majority's refusal to predicate a mistake of law defense on a reasonable
misinterpretation of a statute violated the plain meaning of the
mistake statute,3 2 as well as the basic precepts of the criminal justice system. The dissent further proposed that in order to uphold
is, has the law been violated?'" Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
In Weiss, the court held that the defendant, who was charged with kidnapping, was
entitled to a mistake of law defense because he acted with the honest belief that seizing and
confining the child was done with "authority of law," thereby negating the necessary element of the crime of kidnapping, namely, intent, without authority of law, to confine or
imprison another. Weiss, 276 N.Y. at 388, 12 N.E.2d at 515.
Judge Bellacosa analogized Marreroto Gardnerin that "the weapons possession statute
violated by this defendant imposes liability irrespective of one's intent." Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d
at 386, 507 N.E.2d at 1069, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
" Id. at 390, 507 N.E.2d at 1072, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 215. The court determined that "mistake of law is a viable exemption in those instances where an individual demonstrates an
effort to learn what the law is, relies on the validity of that law and, later, it is determined
that there was a mistake in the law itself." Id. (emphasis omitted). In contrast, Marrero's
mistake of law defense, founded upon his mistaken belief that the "peace officer" exemption
was applicable to him, was vitiated because the mistake was not a situation where the government "ha[d] affirmatively, albeit unintentionally, misled an individual as to what may or
may not be legally permissible conduct." Id. at 390, 507 N.E.2d at 1072, 515 N.Y.S.2d at
216.
" Id. at 391, 507 N.E.2d at 1073, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 217. The court reasoned that acceptance of the defendant's argument as to a reasonable mistake or misinterpretation of the law
being a defense would allow the exception to "swallow the rule." Id. Such a determination
by the court would: encourage mistakes about the law; result in a flood of mistake of law
defenses in criminal prosecutions; and create "opportunities for wrong-minded individuals
to contrive in bad faith solely to get an exculpatory notion before the jury." Id.
32 Id. at 392, 507 N.E.2d at 1073, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 217 (Hancock, J., dissenting). The
dissent asserted that the majority's construction of Penal Law section 15.20(2)(a) ignored
the plain meaning of the statute. Id. at 396, 507 N.E.2d at 1075, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 219 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent contended that the language of the mistake statute
should have been read in a manner which would have provided that if the defendant entertained an honest, mistaken belief based on his interpretation of "an official statement of the
law" codified in a statute, then he would have been afforded the defense of mistake of law.
Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Judge Hancock concluded that the majority's construction was anomalous since it led to
the position that a mistake of law defense is available only to those who correctly read and
interpret a statute. Id. at 398, 507 N.E.2d at 1077, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
11 See id. at 392-95, 507 N.E.2d at 1073-75, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 217-19 (Hancock, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that "it is simply wrong to punish someone who, in good faith
reliance on the wording of a statute, believed that what he was doing was lawful." Id. at 394,
507 N.E.2d at 1074, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 218 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Judge Hancock stated
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the legislative purpose of reforming the common law rule, ignoratia legis, an interpretation which promoted a mistake of law defense was necessary.3 4 Moreover, the dissent maintained that the
policy reasons relied upon by the court in rejecting the mistake of
law defense were not justified.3 5 Thus, a limited mistake of law defense should have been available to the defendant based on his erroneous but reasonable belief that the statute did not proscribe his
36
conduct.
Assuming arguendo that the majority was correct in concluding that New York's mistake statute should be narrowly construed,
it is submitted that the court incorrectly failed to recognize existing common-law theories that could have been applied to provide for a common-law mistake of law defense under circumstances
such as those evidenced in Marrero.This Comment will suggest an
alternative rationale that could have been employed by the court
to permit a mistake of law defense without advancing an unrestrained and uncontrollable use thereof, and would have resulted
in the furtherance of substantial justice by strengthening the crucial link between blameworthiness and criminal liability.
PROPRIETY OF EXPANDING MISTAKE OF LAW DOCTRINE

BEYOND LIMITS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE

Although courts generally will avoid creating exceptions to
statutory provisions that are not embodied in the statute itself,37
that the majority's conclusion is "contrary to 'the notion that punishment should be conditioned on a showing of subjective moral blameworthiness.'" Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting)
(quoting Note, Apparent Authority, supra note 5, at 784).
3 See Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d at 399, 507 N.E.2d at 1077, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (Hancock,
J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 403-04, 507 N.E.2d at 1080, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Judge Hancock argued that "[i]t is no answer to protest that the defense may become a
'false and diversionary stratagem[]' or that 'wrongminded individuals [could] contrive [an]
infinite number of mistake of law defenses'; for it is the very business of the courts to separate the true claims from the false." Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 398-99, 507 N.E.2d at 1077, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Judge Hancock contended that the defendant's reasonable but mistaken belief that he was a
"peace officer" as defined by the Criminal Procedure Law was an example of the scenario
under which a mistake of law defense should apply under Penal Law section 15.20(2) (a). Id.
(Hancock, J., dissenting).
'7 See Mack v. Mendels, 249 N.Y. 356, 359, 164 N.E. 248, 249 (1928); see also Taylor v.
New York Cent. R.R. Co., 294 N.Y. 397, 402, 62 N.E.2d 777, 779 (1945) (court cannot imply
exception not provided for in statute), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 786 (1946); In re Moore's Estate, 178 Misc. 1010, 1012, 36 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1942) (when statute
employs general language, court may not infer exclusion).
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they have acknowledged that in an appropriate case an implied exception may be recognized to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result. s Such exceptions have been implied by the judiciary to effectuate legislative intent when it is apparent that application of the
plain language of the statute would be unjust.3 9
It is submitted that, in view of the severity of the punishment
to which the defendant could have been subject upon conviction,4 0
and the difficulty he had in ascertaining his status as a "peace officer" because of the ambiguity of the exemption statute,4 1 the
Marrero court could have employed a common-law exception to
Penal Law section 265.02 based on a reasonable misinterpretation
of Criminal Procedure Law section 2.10 without usurping legislative authority.
APPLICATION OF COMMON-LAW THEORIES TO

Marrero

Mistake of Law as to a CollateralMatter
Although a mistake of law as to the criminal offense commit'8 See American Dock Co. v. City of New York, 174 Misc. 813, 819, 21 N.Y.S.2d 943,
952 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 1063, 26 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 286 N.Y. 658, 36 N.E.2d 696 (1941).
'9 See In re Burns, 1 Misc. 2d 491, 494-95, 148 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
County 1955). When interpreting statutes, courts have presumed that "no unjust or unreasonable result was intended by the Legislature" thus to abide by the intention of the legislature, "language general in expression may be subjected to exceptions through implication."
In re Meyer, 209 N.Y. 386, 389-90, 103 N.E. 713, 714 (1913).
The Supreme Court similarly has held that statutes "should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character."
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1869).
'0 Under section 265.02 of the Penal Law, criminal possession of a weapon in the third
degree is a class D felony, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1988), with a
maximum sentence of seven years. Id. § 70(d) (McKinney 1987). "[Tlhe infamy . . . of a
felony ....
is ' ... as bad a word as you can give to man or thing."' Morissette v. United

States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (quoting 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
ENGLISH LAW 465 (1895)).

THE HISTORY OF

41 See People v. Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d 382, 397, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1076, 515 N.Y.S.2d 212,
220 (1987) (Hancock, J., dissenting). Marrero mistakenly believed that he could carry a
weapon in New York based on the express exemption for peace officers as defined by Criminal Procedure Law section 2.10(25) as a correction officer "of any penal correctional institution." Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The defendant could not foresee
that the court would eventually resolve the question of his status against him. Id. (Hancock,
J., dissenting). It should be noted that defendant's good faith belief that his employment as
a correctional officer at a Connecticut correctional facility qualified him under the statute,
was shared by the trial court, which dismissed the indictment, and by two judges on the
five-member panel of the Appellate Division. Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).

IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW
ted is not recognized as a defense,4 2 many courts and commentators have espoused the view that mistake of law as to a collateral
matter, such as legal status, is a defense to a criminal prosecution
when it negates the culpable mental state required for the commission of a particular crime. 43 Where such a mental state is not expressly stated in the statute, the court, to avoid injustice, may read
a requirement of fault, such as general criminal intent, 44 into a
strict liability offense.45 The applicable statutes in Marrero, when
read successively, provide that a defendant is guilty of criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree when he possesses a
weapon without a permit unless the defendant is a "peace officer. '' 46 Given such a reading, it is submitted that there is an implied condition for criminal liability to appropriately result: the defendant must not reasonably believe that he is a "peace officer"
under the statute. Moreover, if the defendant reasonably believes
that he is a "peace officer," he will not have the requisite general

criminal intent that justice demands be implied into the statute.
42 See Hall & Seligman, supra note 3, at 644. There is no mistake of law defense if the

defendant took "[an] umbrella he knew was owned by another but he could honestly say
that he was unaware that such taking was proscribed by the criminal law." W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, supra note 4, § 5.1, at 407. Thus, in a "situation in which the defendant is unaware
of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct" there is no mistake of law defense. See
id. at 406.
43 See id. at 406-07 nn.3-9. A mistake of law defense is appropriate "where the defendant has a mistaken impression concerning the legal effect of some collateral matter and that
mistake results in his misunderstanding the full significance of his conduct." Id. at 406. See,
e.g., People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 804, 299 P.2d 850, 855-56 (1956) (bona fide, reasonable
belief that spouse was free to remarry constituted valid defense to bigamy charges); Long v.
State, 44 Del. 262, 277, 65 A.2d 489, 498 (1949) (defendant who honestly believed he was
divorced allowed to proceed to jury on mistake of law defense as did not possess "general
criminal intent" to commit bigamy).
44 See

Long, 44 Del. at 276, 65 A.2d at 496. See generally G.

FLETCHER, RETHINKING

452-54 (1978) (discussing what state of mind proscribed conduct requires).
45 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 1980). Section 15.15(2) provides:
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an
offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission
of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if
the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute
defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental culpability.

CRIMINAL LAW

Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted a statute which provided that, "if any justice, etc. shall receive or take, by color of his office, any fee or reward . . . he shall be
punished," to include a general corrupt intent when the defendant, a justice of the peace,
innocently took money believing that he had a legal right to it. Cutter v. State, 36 N.J.L.
125, 126-27 (1873).
46 See supra notes 13, 15-17 and accompanying text.
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The defendant in Marrero was not mistaken as to the actual
offense charged: he knew that it was illegal to carry a loaded
weapon in New York unless he was a "peace officer" under the
meaning of section 2.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law, but at the
time of his arrest, he reasonably believed that he possessed the
requisite status.47 Thus, it is suggested that the collateral matter
doctrine adequately supplies the doctrinal justification necessary
to imply an exception to statutes such as Penal Law section 265.02,
which do not require a particular mental state, when an individual
entertains a good faith, erroneous belief that he is entitled to an
exemption from criminal liability based upon his status. 48
Innocent Possession
To avoid injustice in criminal prosecutions, New York courts
have used the doctrine of innocent possession, an implied excepSee supra note 14 and accompanying text.
"1 See United States v. Fierros, 692 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1120 (1983). When the defendant is ignorant or mistaken as to an independently determined legal status or condition that is an operative fact of the crime, a defense of mistake of
law will be permitted although it is not specifically written into the criminal statute. Id. "In
such a case, the mistake of the law is for practical purposes a mistake of fact." Id.
When a defendant "does an act under an erroneous idea of a situation reached by applying law to facts, if the act done would not be criminal provided the situation were as he
believed it, [he] ...should have a good defense." See Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the
Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75, 91 (1908).
In Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949), the defendant, who remarried honestly believing that he was divorced, was charged with bigamy. Id. at 275, 65 A.2d at 495.
The applicable statute provided that "[w]hoever, having contracted marriage, shall, in the
lifetime of his or her husband or wife, marry with another person ... shall be deemed guilty
of bigamy .. " Id. at 276, 65 A.2d at 496. However, several exceptions were statutorily
created to alleviate the harshness of this rule in certain circumstances. See id. In deciding
whether the defendant's honest belief was a defense, the Long court considered the behavior
defined by the statute as criminal, the exemptions expressly provided for as a defense
thereto, and the serious nature of the punishment specified for the offense. See id. The
court ultimately held that "the statute does not exclude as a defense the absence of general
criminal intent; that is, the intent to do what would constitute a crime if the surrounding
circumstances were such as a reasonable man in the defendant's position would likely believe them to be." Id.
It is submitted that the facts of Marrero are analogous to those in Long in that the
codification of the offense lacked a culpable mental state, but carved out exemptions in
certain circumstances. In addition, in each case the defendant asserted that he was entitled
to act by virtue of his mistaken but good faith belief in his status. For the same reasons that
motivated the Delaware Supreme Court to order a new trial for Long, it is suggested that
the New York Court of Appeals should have likewise held that Marrero's mistake negated
his "criminal mind" thereby exempting him from criminal liability.
17
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tion to a charge under Penal Law section 265.02. 49 The doctrine
provides that although criminal possession in the third degree does
not require an intentional state of mind, when the accused's possession may be classified as innocent" the criminal act of possession is negated by the innocent nature of such possession.5 1 It is
suggested that in Marrero, the defendant's reasonable belief, based
on the ambiguity inherent in the statute, that his conduct was not
prohibited, did in fact create a case of possession by an innocent
act.2 This afforded the court a justifiable opportunity to broaden
the already existing implied exception so as to encompass the defendant's innocent conduct.5 3
Due Process
Due process has been defined as requiring the fundamental
fairness essential to the very concept of justice as applied to each
"'See People v. Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d 126, 464 N.E.2d 463, 476 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1984).
The New York Court of Appeals has held that "[i]n some circumstances.
a person may
possess an unlicensed or proscribed weapon and still not be guilty of a crime because of the
innocent nature of the possession. This defense of 'temporary and lawful' possession applies
because as a matter of policy the conduct is not deemed criminal." Id. at 130, 464 N.E.2d at
465, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
10 See People v. Gaines, 75 App. Div. 2d 826, 826, 427 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (2d Dep't
1980); People v. Trucchio, 47 App. Div. 2d 934, 934, 367 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (2d Dep't 1975); see
also People v. LaPella, 272 N.Y. 81, 83, 4 N.E.2d 943, 943 (1936) (defendant who finds
weapon and is delivering it to police excused by innocent possession exception); People v.
Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 402, 97 N.E. 877, 878 (1912) (temporary and incidental possession
resulting from performance of a lawful act, such as disarming a wrongful possessor, is innocent possession).
" See Almodovar, 62 N.Y.2d at 130, 464 N.E.2d at 465, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
9" See generally People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 804, 299 P.2d 850, 855 (1956). "At
common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if
true, would make the act for which the person is indicted an innocent act, has always been
held to be a good defense." Id. (quoting Ex parte Ahart, 172 Cal. 762, 764-65, 159 P. 160,
161-62 (1916)). Furthermore, the above exception applies where statutory offenses are concerned unless it is "excluded expressly or by necessary implication." Id.
" See People v. Furey, 13 App. Div. 2d 412, 217 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1st Dep't 1961). A
strong line of cases construe the crime of criminal possession of a weapon as "accommodating many varieties of innocent possession." Id. at 415, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 192. See, e.g., People
v. Trucchio, 47 App. Div. 2d 934, 934, 367 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (2d Dep't 1975) (holding gun for
friend, unaware it was loaded, could be innocent possession if so found by jury); People v.
Harmon, 7 App. Div. 2d 159, 159, 180 N.Y.S.2d 939, 940 (4th Dep't 1959) (jury might have
found that defendant innocently possessed blackjack taken from aggressor during fight); cf.
People v. Williams, 50 N.Y.2d 1043, 1045, 409 N.E.2d 1372, 1373, 431 N.Y.S.2d 698, 699
(1980) (finding gun and thereafter handling it in dangerous manner, thereby causing injury
not innocent possession).
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particular case." Moreover, due process demands that criminal liability not be imposed when the accused cannot reasonably comprehend that the contemplated conduct is proscribed.5 5 Generally, due
process implications arise when a penal statute is so ambiguous
that it forces one to guess as to the meaning intended by the legislature.56 In recognition of such concerns, many courts and legal
scholars believe that when an ambiguity in a statute creates a reasonable but mistaken belief in the mind of the defendant that his
conduct is not proscribed by the criminal law, justice dictates that
57
a mistake of law defense be available.
" See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960). The Supreme Court has stated that due process is concerned with "the denial of that 'fundamental
fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice.'" Id. (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 462 (1942)). See also People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 363, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1951) (due
process safeguards "[t]he essential fairness which is supposed to form the warp and woof of
our fabric of justice"), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918 (1953). Furthermore, "[d]ue process of law
is not a rigid or static expression. It is a concept of what is fundamentally just ... and the
courts in determining whether the constitutional demands of due process have been met and
satisfied in any particular case, must decide the question on the facts of that case." People
v. Colozzo, 54 Misc. 2d 687, 691, 283 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967), aff'd,
32 App. Div. 2d 927, 303 N.Y.S.2d 348 (2d Dep't 1969).
" See People ex rel. Serra v. Warden, Rikers Island Men's House of Detention, 90
Misc. 2d 654, 656, 395 N.Y.S.2d 602, 604 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1977).
" See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). The Supreme Court has held
that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids." Id. See also People v. Dioguardi, 8 App. Div. 2d 426, 434, 188 N.Y.S.2d 84, 93 (1st
Dep't 1959) (penal statute should not lend itself to double meaning), rev'd on other
grounds, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960).
" See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 244 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975); see also United States v. Cianciulli, 482 F. Supp.
585, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (when applicable law is unclear and defendant has acted upon
erroneous but reasonable interpretation, an exception will be made); Burns v. State, 123
Tex. Crim. 611, 611-12, 61 S.W.2d 512, 513 (1933) (if defendant reasonably believes his act
to be lawful because law obscure and unascertainable, mistake of law defense available).
It has been argued that if a statute is unclear, ambiguous or not judicially determined, a
citizen should not be penalized when his good faith mistaken belief results in the commission of an act which is later held to be illegal. Perkins, supra note 3, at 44-45. One commentator contends that a basic assumption implied in the mistake of law doctrine is that such
claims are usually fraudulent. Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. Ra~v. 189, 208-09 (1985). However, it is incumbent on the courts to separate those claims brought in good faith from those fraudulently offered. See id. at 209. Since
notice of wrongdoing is an essential element of justice, a judicial system must allow a defense if, through an honest mistake of law, a citizen was not put on notice that his conduct
was proscribed. See id.
Furthermore, if statutory language is unclear or ambiguous, then the state, being responsible for the lack of clarity, and not the individual, should bear the responsibility. See
Ryu & Silving, supra note 1, at 438.
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In Marrero, the statute upon which the defendant relied in
good faith was inherently ambiguous,58 and Marrero was thereby
deprived of fair warning that his conduct was criminal.5 9 It is proposed that this final operative theory was a fundamental basis
upon which the Marrero court could have relied in determining
that due process demands the availability of a mistake of law
defense.60
CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Marrero establishes a precedent of strict adherence to the ancient rules
of ignorantia legis and errorjuris, despite societal changes which
have caused intricacies and complexities in the law which could
not have been foreseen by rules meant to address a more simple
society.61 Such a narrow construction of New York's mistake statute without adopting an implied exception for a reasonable misin58 See supra notes 19-20. It is submitted that the language "any state correctional facility" as codified in Criminal Procedure Law section 2.10(25) is ambiguous in that it may
suggest either any state facility in the United States or any New York State facility alone;
the former being in harmony with the plain meaning of the statute.
" See People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 253 N.E.2d 202, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1969).
The court stated that "a statute must be sufficiently definite to give a reasonable man subject to it notice of the nature of what is prohibited and what is required of him." Id. at 337,
253 N.E.2d at 205, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
"0See Cass, supra note 2, at 691-94. Justice requires that ignorance or mistake of the
law should be a defense when the defendant's mistaken belief is not blameworthy. Id. at
692.
[Tihe judge or jury in each case should ask whether the particular ignorance
claimed by a defendant is in fact blameworthy. This determination should not
present inordinate difficulties; the usual question ... would be whether a reasonable, prudent member of the community of average intelligence would be aware of
the violated law.
Id. at 693.
"RSee People v. Studifin, 132 Misc. 2d 326, 504 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1986). In Studifin, Justice Broomer stated:
Once life was simpler. Men lived and were governed by short catchy sayings: Possession is nine tenths of the law; all men are presumed to know the law; and its
corollary-ignorance of the law is no excuse. Simple rules sufficed in a simpler
time.
In an age that valued simplicity, strict adherence to principle made for a swift
and uncomplicated system of criminal justice . . . [which], while justified in the
interest of society, was often unnecessarily cruel ....
Today, we are said to be more sophisticated ....Our social order values the
individual who has rights he can assert against the State, especially in situations
where the very State that seeks to punish him misled him into a violation of law.
Id. at 327, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
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terpretation of an ambiguously drawn statute will result in the
punishment of those acting with an innocent mind, and as such,
cannot but beget injustice.2 The judiciary must, hereafter, place
greater emphasis on the particular facts and circumstances giving
rise to an ignorance or mistake of law defense, and recognize that
exceptions must be integrated into such rules by balancing the policies that underlie the common law maxims against judicial interest in achieving justice for each individual. Thus, conformity to
lifeless legal precepts would be avoided and the spirit of the law,
which demands a departure from strict adherence to ignorantia
legis and error juris, would be achieved.
Athy Poulos-Mobilia

62 See Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 277, 65 A.2d 489, 498 (1949). To hold a person punishable as a criminal when he affirmatively shows an effort to abide by the law "tested by
objective standards rather than the defendant's subjective state of mind ... would be palpably unjust and arbitrary." Id.

